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ABSTRACT
Advances in sensing, networking, and actuation technologies have
resulted in the IoT wave that is expected to revolutionize all aspects
of modern society. This paper focuses on the new challenges of
privacy that arise in IoT in the context of smart homes. Specifi-
cally, the paper focuses on preventing the user’s privacy via infer-
ences through channel and in-home device activities. We propose
a method for securely scheduling the devices while decoupling the
device and channels activities. The proposed solution avoids any
attacks that may reveal the coordinated schedule of the devices,
and hence, also, assures that inferences that may compromise in-
dividual’s privacy are not leaked due to device and channel level
activities. Our experiments also validate the proposed approach,
and consequently, an adversary cannot infer device and channel
activities by just observing the network traffic.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The IoT devices are quickly becoming a pervasive and integral part
of modern smart homes [9]. The homeowner, typically, possesses
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a heterogeneous set of devices ranging from wearable devices, in-
formation/entertainment devices to smart home appliances. These
devices provide comfort/assisted-living and/or improve sustainabil-
ity, reduce costs, and reduce carbon footprint. For example, a Belkin
Wemo switch can automatically switch lights on/off and open/close
window shades based on the sunlight and time of the day. Likewise,
dampers in the AC vent can be partially/fully opened/closed to mod-
ulate airflow. Other devices popular in smart homes include Nest
cameras, smart door locks, Lenovo Smart Assistant, Amazon Echo,
Echo dot, Echo show, Alexa, Philips-Hue Bloom/Lightstrip Plus,
SteriGrip self-cleaning door handles, Unico smartbrush, Sensus
Metering Systems, and Logitech Circle 2 among others.
While the emerging smart home devices provide significant ben-
efits, the support for security in such devices is often limited to the
security offered by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
Lack of strong end-to-end architecture for security has led to de-
vices being vulnerable to a variety of attacks. For example, McAfee
Labs [1] found that the well-known Wi-Fi-enabled Wemo Insight
Smart Plug has critical security vulnerability due to Universal Plug
and Play (UPnP) protocol library it uses, which, due to design flaws,
enable attackers to execute remote codes on this smart plug. Note
that this attack is not just limited to disturbing smart plug’s nor-
mal operations such as shutting it down unexpectedly, but could
also use the smart plug as an entry point for a larger attack in the
network. Further, [1] showed the usage of a compromised WeMo
switch as a middleman to launch attacks against a TCL smart TV.
The privacy vulnerabilities introduced by smart home devices
are even more challenging. IoT devices capture, store, share, and
(depending upon the underlying computational architecture) out-
source personal data that can lead to inferences about individual’s
habits, behavior, family dynamics etc. Challenges arise since privacy
leakage can occur through direct data leakage, as well as, through
inferences based on device actuations, interactions, and schedules.
For instance, the timing of the actuation of a coffee machine, if
leaked can allow an adversary to determine when a family wakes
up. Likewise, locking and unlocking schedule of door locks can en-
able leakage of the time when no one is at home, etc. While privacy
challenges from data leakage can be prevented by encrypting de-
vice data and network payloads, inferences about device actuation
and schedule are significantly more complex to hide due to leakage
from network traffic patterns at the channel level, at the hub/router
level or at the cloud level.
For example, Figure 1 shows the channel traffic generated by
three different devices. The figure clearly shows that each device
generates a very distinct traffic pattern and, the adversary, having
access to the channel traffic can figure out which device is activated
leading to potential inferences about user’s personal habits. Note
that such an inference, since it is independent of the actual network
payload, is not prevented by encryption.
Inferences from monitoring channel traffic can also arise due to
the characteristics of the current network protocols. For instance,
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Figure 1: Channel activity for home devices.
The figure above shows the channel activity for three home devices: CloudCam, Google Home,
and Belkin WeMo. The CloudCam shows a peak in the channel activity (up to 400 KB/s traffic rate)
as the user enters the home, moves inside the home or exits the home. The Google Home shows a
peak in the channel activity (up to 250 KB/s traffic rate) whenever a user initiated a voice
command for the light bulbs to turn on/off. Similarly, a bi-state WeMo switch peaks during the on
state and creates a channel activity lesser than 20 KB/s.
in the widely used 802.11 Wi-Fi protocol, while a message payload
is encrypted in a password-protected network, the MAC addresses
of both the sender and receiver are in cleartext. This is to prevent
requiring every potential device on the network to have to decrypt
a message just to determine if the message is intended for the de-
vice. The leakage of the sender/receiver MAC address, coupled with
the fact that manufacturer’s information is commonly encoded in
plain-text device identifier, can lead to leakage of the identity of
the device from the network traffic, which, in turn, can lead to an
attack on user’s privacy. For example, the MAC address of Amazon
CloudCam security camera used in our experiment to transmit
video footage over Wi-Fi is F0-81-73-23-CC-75. The first 3 bytes
of such a MAC address (e.g., F0-81-73) can be searched in the pub-
licly accessible IEEE Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) [2]
dataset to find the vendor related information (e.g., Amazon device).
Furthermore, by monitoring the device’s traffic patterns and the
fact that Amazon only manufactures a limited range of devices (e.g.,
Kindle, CloudCam, Echo, etc.), it is easier to infer the device type
by merely overhearing the traffic.
In this paper, we study privacy leakage that may occur from
device activity and network channel traffic analysis and develop
protocols that can be used to prevent such leakages. We focus, in
particular, on device workflows that are common in smart homes.
By a device workflow, we refer to a coordinated sequence of device
actuations. Device workflows may arise in a triggered (or synchro-
nized) manner or in a scheduled manner. The synchronized work-
flows arise as a result of one device resulting in an actuation of the
other. For instance, sensors determining occupancy change in a
part of the building may result in HVAC controls /AC vents to be
redirected to the occupied areas and to close other vents that cover
areas with no occupancy. Likewise, light intensity sensors coupled
with thermal sensors may detect the amount of sunlight entering
the room and accordingly lower/raise the sunshades based on the
homeowner’s preference. A scheduled workflow, on the other hand,
is scheduled actuation of a set of devices that occur at specific time
intervals of each other based on a schedule. For instance, switching
on a coffee machine at a specific time in the morning followed by
warming of the car seats a given time interval following that, and
then opening/closing of door locks following the actuation of the
car seat warmer might be on a schedule. A more elaborate example
of a scheduled workflow could be a homeowner’s routine related to
returning. A homeowner may schedule the smart car to self-drive to
home to initiate the workflow. Fifteen minutes after the start of the
workflow, the heating/cooling system may start off to ensure that
the home is at the comfortable temperature on arrival. Likewise,
half an hour after the trip starts the oven may be set to a pre-heat
and the laundry machine turns on if the load is detected.
We focus on the scheduled workflows in this paper since such
workflows require hiding the identity of the devices being actuated
but also their schedule. As will become clear, mechanisms to prevent
leakage for scheduled workflows will also prevent leakage from
triggered workflows. Furthermore, the scheduled activities can lead
not just to adversary learning user’s past behavior but also their
future activities which can lead to more severe consequences.
The problem. This paper deals with a problem of avoiding infer-
ence attacks on the scheduled workflows in a home network. The
workflows can be identified through coupling between the channel
and device activity. Basically, there are two crucial concepts that are
subject to privacy violations: workflow (i.e., the specific order of
device actuation) and workflow execution (i.e., duration in which
the devices coordinate, and the resulting device actuations unfold).
Our problem statement considers hiding both the workflow and
the execution of the workflow.
The privacy violations can occur as a result of two threats: first,
overhearing the channel activity as a means to infer device activity
pattern, second, accessing the device temporarily and be able to
analyze the state of workflow execution. In the latter case, the
adversary can read the sent/received messages or the internal state
of the device. Both of the above threats may assist the adversary to
predict users’ activities, such as presence/absence, arrival/departure,
and localization etc.
Contributions. Our contributions are twofold:
(1) A new architecture for in-home communication among the de-
vices and the hub through passing a token carrying commands.
The token passing communication model decouples the channel
and device activities so that the devices interact with the hub and
the other devices without revealing the communication pattern.
In addition, this architecture is also useful for secure data upload
from devices to the hub, while also hiding the device footprints
that has generated the data.
(2) We provide an owner-defined pre-scheduling mechanism for all
devices that are connected with the hub in a pre-defined topology.
The proposed approach uses a single message transmission for
all N devices while ensuring that the in-home communication
remains peakless. The scheduling mechanism is secure against
a computationally unbounded adversary and, also, verifies the
delay between each device actuation.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the
system setting, the adversarial model, security goals, and design
requirements. Section 3 provides our proposed scheduling algo-
rithm for home networks. Section 4 provides proofs of security and
privacy. Finally, Section 5 provides an experimental evaluation of
the approach. All notations are given in Table 1.
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Notations Meaning Notations Meaning
O A homeowner H Hub
Oid Owner’s identity Hid Hub identity
D Device Did Device identity
OPK Owner public key OSK Owner secret key
HPK hub public key HSK hub secret key
DPK device public key DSK device secret key
cl partially ordered l commands mi puzzle message for i th device
n modulus a random chosen integer
tˆ time complexity of puzzle t ′ time to decrypt command
S capacity of puzzle solver S′ enhanced capacity
Sign(OSK ) Signature using secret-keyOSK N number of devices
Ek encrypted key k Ez encrypted command z
ks static key nPn n permutations
ϕ(n) Euler’s totient on n bo overwritten data bits
bд device generated data bits br random data bits
p large prime number q second large prime number
tval command validity time tcur current time
t ircv token receiving time t ifwd token forwarding time
tHbeg token round beginning time at hub t
H
end token round ending time at hub
tdiff allowed clock drift time tcom total computation time
tAcom puzzle computation time by adversary ϵ negligibly small value
A adversary aˆ malicious commands
T token H One-way hash function
Data field data upload field btoggle toggle bit string field
R partial order E′ partially ordered set
Table 1: Notations
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the system model, the adversarial model,
inference attacks on the user privacy, an overview of our proposed
approach to prevent inference attacks, design requirements, and
building blocks of the proposed algorithms.
2.1 The Model
Network assumptions. We consider a homeowner, O , who owns a
collection of N (D1,D2, . . . ,DN ) heterogenous smart home devices
that provide different functionalities to the owner. Each device Di
has a unique identity, denoted by Diid . All devices might possess
heterogeneous hardware/software underneath, and be located on
different spatial (devices that are not in the line-of-sight) dimen-
sions. These ad-hoc devices can shift in space in the smart home,
and hence, might have a different set of peer devices at different
time intervals. We assume that each device possesses a read-only
hardware clock, and due to the ad-hoc nature of devices, we assume
a clock drift within the bound tdiff such that two clocks cannot
differ beyond the tdiff amount of time.
The owner initializes the devices and a controlling hub, H , using
proper security mechanisms. We will list our assumptions about the
underlying security mechanism below. In our model, the network
is configured as a ring topology, which poses an ordering among
devices, unlike the model that the current smart home devices use,
where the owner communicates directly to the desired device via
the hub. This ring topology could be built directly among devices
and hub, if the communication protocols they use have P2P commu-
nication capability, like Zig-Bee, BLE, and Wi-Fi. Alternatively, it
could be built as an overlay on top of a star topology network, like
Wi-Fi infrastructure mode. In this case, if a device tries to forward
the message to the next device in the proposed ring topology, then
it needs to first send the message to the hub, and the hub, then, di-
rectly forwards the message to its next device. Note that we do not
discuss a failure-resilient ring topology and existing fault-tolerant
schemes can be leveraged here.
The owner sends workflows to the home devices through the
hub. After receiving a workflow, the device gets actuated, stores
its corresponding command, and forwards the workflow received
from the previous device to the next device in the topology. After
executing the command, the device may generate the data (for
example, Nest camera starts recording and sends data whenever
motion is detected). We use the ring topology to send this data to
the hub that may be stored at the hub or may be transmitted to the
cloud.1 In this paper, we use the words ‘command execution’ and
‘workflow execution’ interchangeably.
Token. In our ring topology, we circulate a token that has three
fields: (i) command field, which carries a computational puzzle and
the workflow, (ii) data field, which carries the data generated by
devices to deliver to the hub, and (iii) toggle bit string, which is
used to indicate which device has generated the data to the hub.
Details of the token are given in Section 3.
Security assumptions. Each device, hub, and homeowner possess the
corresponding signing key-pair, i.e., (DiSK ,D
i
PK ), (HSK ,HPK ), and
(OSK ,OPK ), respectively. We do not assume an arbitrary behavior
from the owner or the hub. The homeowner and hubmutually verify
the identities of each other through digital signatures in order to
build the trust between them. Therefore, the hub and the owner
trust each other, and an adversary cannot compromise either the
homeowner or the hub. Further, the hub and devices build their own
trust that is also based on the knowledge of a certified public-private
key-pair of home devices.
2.2 Adversarial Model
The devices execute user-defined commands or workflows, as men-
tioned previously. The adversary wishes to learn the commands or
workflows and the execution of workflows based on the encrypted
network traffic to infer the user privacy. This type of adversary is
similar to the adversary considered in [6, 14]. Thus, the adversary
has access to the secure (encrypted) messages flowing among the
devices and the hub/homeowner. Further, we assume that the adver-
sary knows the number of smart devices in the home. Based on this
information, the adversary aims to learn: (i) the device activities,
and (ii) coupling between the channel and the device activities.
However, the adversary cannot inject any fabricated messages over
the channel to assess the state of the devices.
Further, we assume that the adversary may gain a short-term
physical access2 to the device, and hence, can retrieve the device
1Recall that we are not dealing with how the data will be transmitted from the hub to
the cloud without revealing anything. Our solution hides any activity within the home,
i.e., how the data will be transmitted by the device to the hub without any privacy
violations.
2For example, an inspection authority has to visit the home for a periodic inspection
in the absence of the homeowner. In this case, the inspection might be related to
any leakage detection, maintenance issues, insurance issues, etc. This short visit to
the home for an inspection allows them to monitor and check home devices as well.
However, based on our proposed solution, those inspecting authorities would not be
3
state or messages. The objective behind gaining a short-term access
to any device is to predict the future workflows of devices to infer
the user activity. Our objective is to prevent the adversary to know
(i) which device has received the messages at which time, (ii) when
would a device execute the command, and (iii) which devices have
executed the command at which time3.
Adversarial view and inference attacks.When the user wishes
to execute any command at a smart home device, an adversary
knows which device received the message from the user at what
time due to the network traffic generated by the user. Note that
this information is revealed, because in network protocols such as
802.11 MAC addresses or the device identifiers are transmitted in
cleartext, and only the payload is encrypted, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 1. Further, the device may also produce some data in response
to the requested message, and this also reveals to the adversary
which device has generated the data at what time. We refer such in-
formation as the adversarial view, denoted by AV : AV = Inc ∪Opd ,
where Inc refers to the command given to the device at some time
and Opd refers to the data generated by the device after executing
the command.
Users command Adversarial view
Inc Opd
For D1 E(c1), D1, t1 No
For D2 E(c2 ), D2, t2 E(d2 ), D2, t3
Table 2: Adversarial view.
For example, consider that there are two devices, say D1 and D2,
in the home. In Table 2, the first row shows that the user transmits
a command to the device D1. Though the device D1 receives this
encrypted command, denoted by E(c1), the adversary knows that a
command is received at time t1 by the device D1 and the device D1
has not generated any data in response the command. The second
row shows that the adversary knows the device D2 receives an
encrypted command E(c2) at time t2 and generated encrypted data
E(d2) at time t3. Hence, simply based on the above characteristic of
the arrival of a message and generation of data, the adversary can
determine which device was actuated.
2.3 Preventing Inference Attacks: overview of
our Approach
In order to prevent inference attacks, we develop an approach that
decouples the device and channel activities. In short, the approach
provides an ability to pre-schedule a set of commands for home
devices, where the homeowner defines: (a) what should be the
workflow/schedule of home devices, and (b) when should the de-
vices execute a workflow. Informally, the proposed approach works
as follows:
(1) The owner invokes the hub by sending an encrypted schedule or
workflow of the devices. Here, the hub authenticates the owner to
validate the encrypted schedule. This step provides a guarantee that
no channel spoofing or message re-transmission have occurred.
able to analyze the current state of the devices or the activity pattern of the devices in
near future.
3The command execution could enable the device to produce visible or auditory cues
such as blinking lights or machine being activated which, in turn, may leak the state
of the device. Such inferences from physical cues are outside the scope of the paper.
We assume that the adversary does not have access to such device data.
(2) After a successful authentication phase, the hub creates a token
(T ) to circulate the schedule to be executed by devices. This token
rotates continuously in the topology. Note that in the token, de-
vice identifiers or MAC addresses are also encrypted. Further note
that whenever the user wishes to transmit a schedule to devices,
the immediate next round of token originated by the hub carries
the encrypted schedule, and after that, the encrypted schedule is
replaced by a random message to maintain the token size constant.
(3) On receiving the token, each device retrieves the encrypted sched-
ule that carries device-specific commands. Each device must com-
plete a computation task before executing the original command.
This computation task is referred to as a puzzle throughout the
paper. Then, the device must check the puzzle validity time tval , by
using the current time tcur , and the allowed clock difference tdiff .
If the timer has not expired yet, the device decrypts the message,
executes the puzzle to retrieve the real command to be executed.
(4) As soon as a device finishes the command execution, it may gen-
erate data to be uploaded at the hub (as mentioned in Section 2.1).
Now to hide which device has generated the data, each device fol-
lows a request-based approach, where a device Di flips the ith bit
inside one of the fields of the token to indicate the need to upload
freshly generated data in an anonymous manner. As a result of ith
bit flipping, the hub knows that the device Di has requested the
data upload, and in the next token cycle, the device Di appends the
data inside a dedicated field of the token.
Note that since a constant size token flows regularly in the topology
of the home devices, an adversary observing the network traffic
cannot distinguish which device has received a command at which
time (due to step 2) and which devices have generated the data
(due to step 4). Hence, based on this approach, the adversarial view
for each round of token has the same information, which prevents
inference attacks based on the devices and channel activities.
2.4 Security Goals
This section describes the security properties for preventing any
inferences about the workflow and their executions from the ad-
versary. Let us assume that an adversary knows some auxiliary
information about the devices and the topology such as the num-
ber of devices and the types of devices. However, this auxiliary
information does not increase the probabilistic advantage that an
adversary gains over any instance of the protocol. In particular,
an adversary cannot reveal the workflow or the execution time of
the workflow, i.e., which devices execute the command or when
does a device execute the command. The probabilistic advantage of
an adversary, denoted by Adv(A), is derived through the security
properties given below.
Authentication is required during the workflow release from the
homeowner to the hub. This would require a mutual authentication
between the (mobile device held by the) homeowner (to dispatch
the workflow) and the hub (to circulate the workflow anonymously).
Note that establishing the shared secret between the homeowner
and the hub is a one-time process, which is carried each time the
homeowner invokes a new workflow. Here, the homeowner pro-
duces a signature, say Sign, on the ordered commands (cl ) in any
workflow by using its secret-key OSK . Thus, the hub must reject
any other messages signed by a different key, say OSK ′ .
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Pr [(OSK , cl ) → Sign] ≥ 1 − ϵ
Note that ϵ is negligibly small and an adversary cannot produce
a verifiable signature Sign on cl by using OSK ′ instead of OSK .
Anonymity is required during the consistent circulation of the en-
crypted commands such that (i) no channel activity can be mapped
to a device activity, and (ii) no inference on device activity can be
mapped to the device generated data, i.e., which device is sending
data at a specific time. As shown below, the probability of dis-
tinguishing two different tokens (T ,T ′) each carrying different
messages (mi ,mj ) for different devices (i, j) is negligible.
Pr [T (mi )] − Pr [T ′(mj )] < ϵ
Similarly, the probability of distinguishing a token T carrying
the random databr or carrying the overwritten databo , is negligibly
small. Therefore, a token carrying the random data inside the data
field and another token carrying the overwritten data (after data
generation) inside the data field are indistinguishable, hence, solely
based on the token data field no inferences can be derived.
Pr [T (br )] − Pr [T (bo )] < ϵ
Verifiable delay An adversary cannot infer the information about
the device execution ahead of time. Let tˆi be the time a device
would execute even when the adversary has temporary access to
the device.
Pr [tAcom |state] ≊ Pr [tAcom]
The probability of an adversary finishing the computation task
earlier, when it gains temporary access to the device state, is ap-
proximately same as when the adversary does not have access to
the device state. In addition, an adversary cannot outpace a de-
vice that requires tˆ i time to complete the computation task, i.e.,
Pr [tAcom < tˆi ] < ϵ .
An adversary gaining access to the device cannot retrieve the
information required for device actuation, i.e., the computational
task to be executed prior to its actuation. We have described a game-
theoretic approach in Section 4 that shows the overall probabilistic
advantage of an adversary is negligibly small.
2.5 Challenges and Solutions
Implementing reliable ordering for device actuation is to provide
a secure and self-executing state of devices at a pre-defined time
for protecting the owner privacy is deceptively non-trivial. Below,
we discuss the challenges we encountered and describe how we
addressed them.
C1.Anonymous trigger from thehub to devices.Asmentioned
before, we need to mask the channel activities, device activities,
and the coupling between both the channel as well as the devices.
Note that in this context, the encryption techniques merely hide
the meaning of the message across the channel, not the fact that to
which device this message belongs to, and hence, it reveals the user
activity. In addition, the solutions-based on traffic shaping4, which
incur excessive communication and latency overhead, also fail to
decouple the device to channel activities.
Solution. To address this challenge, the distribution of user-
commands to each device in the home network is based on a pre-
defined topology, e.g., ring, where a token rotates continuously
4The traffic shaping solution keeps the constant traffic rate based on a threshold, such
that any excessive traffic above the threshold is delayed through a buffer and below
the threshold requires additional dummy packets.
within the one directional (1-D) ring topology.5 Thereby, channel
activity remains consistent and independent of the devices actuated
as a result of the workflow. In our context, the token (T ) has three
fields: (i) command field, which contains the encrypted commands
corresponding to each device, (ii) data field, which contains the
device generated data, and, (iii) a toggle bit string field, which
contains a N bit string, where each bit denotes a unique device
in the topology. This toggle bit string is used to indicate that a
device is interested in uploading the freshly generated data during
upcoming token arrival at the device. Since the order of device
actuation reveals crucial information about the user activity inside
the home, our token-based solution guarantees a secure ordering
among devices while executing the commands. In addition, the
device actuation is controlled in a manner that a recipient device
itself cannot pre-decode and/or pre-pone the command execution.
C2. Command execution and verifiable ordering. After mask-
ing the channel activity through a constantly rotating token, the
next step is to have a verifiable ordering of command execution at
each device. Each device receives a command through the token.
Now, these devices can decrypt and execute the command imme-
diately. However, it again enables the channel to device activity
mapping. Therefore, the next challenge is to insert an artificial delay
between a device receiving the commands, and then, executing the
commands at an appropriate time, without relating to any specific
channel activity. The artificial delay enables a correct execution
order at each comparable or non-comparable device6.
Solution. The protocol message from the homeowner to hub
includes the ordered commands (cl ) that pass through a device
Di to another device Di+1 using the anonymous token circulation.
The token is encrypted using a shared symmetric key between
the hub and the devices in the topology. The recipient device Di
retrieves the encrypted command (mi ) from the command field
of the token and begins with a puzzle computation. Note that the
devices do not execute the commands immediately after receiving
(time-locked) commands. In particular, these devices wait for a
pre-defined amount of time before executing the command, such
that neither the artificial delay at each device can be known by
the adversary in advance, nor the devices can control this artificial
delay to postpone or prepone the scheduled commands. However,
this waiting period is not idle, and the devices resume on some
computational task.
C3. Anonymous response from devices to the hub. Once the
devices have received the commands in an anonymous manner,
they may generate some data as a result of command execution.
However, uploading this data immediately would reveal the device
activity patterns. Clearly, this periodic channel activity (in the form
of traffic) relates to a specific device that had executed the command
recently. Therefore, the upstream data upload on the hub should
be anonymous too.
5In order to leverage a continuous channel-activity as a means to hide the actual
channel-activity, the ring topology is efficient as compared to star alignment. In
addition, one can also use the mesh-topology with anonymous-routing that requires
asymmetric-key cryptography overheads at each relay-node while sending token
between a source and a destination.
6The comparable-devices are those that are defined under certain relative order in a
workflow. The incomparable-devices are independent and are not restricted under any
relative order with respect to other devices.
5
Solution. In our scheme, each device is required to send a re-
quest for data upload to the hub using the rotating token, which
contains a toggle bit string field of size N bits, where each bit repre-
sents a unique device in the topology. The ith toggled bit indicates
that the device Di has generated the data and is ready to anony-
mously transmit the data by using the data field of the token. The
data field is used to carry the device generated data without re-
vealing the data and the sender of the data. The data field contains
random data as long as there is no request from the devices to send
the data to hub. The details of data upload phase from device to
hub will be clear in step 4, given in Section 3.
2.6 Building Blocks
This section provides a brief overview of basic building blocks used
to develop the proposed solution as detailed in Section 3.
RSA puzzles. The verifiable delay regarding device actuation is
based on cryptographic RSA puzzles [12]. These time-bounded puz-
zles are useful for the applications that require security against
the hardware parallelization attacks (i.e., bypassing a security solu-
tion by running a mathematical problem on different hardware in
parallel) through Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC).
Accordingly, the puzzle solution is based on inherently sequential
operations such asmodular exponentiation. Let us assume that t ′ be
the time to release an encrypted message. Also, a device is capable
of computing S number of square operations modulo n per second.
Thus, the puzzle requires sequenced exponentiations of (a2tˆ mod
n) where n = pq is publicly known RSA modulus and tˆ , p, q and
ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) remains secret. In particular, tˆ = St ′ denotes
the difficulty level of the puzzle for a specific device. Therefore,
the computation of this modular exponentiation operation requires
either the inherently sequential execution of these operations or to
solve the integer factorization problem.
In the proposed scheme, the RSA puzzles enable an artificial yet
verifiable delay with respect to command execution. To compensate
this delay an adversary must know the private key of a device and
then invest the same time as the victim device was supposed to
invest in, for the puzzle computation. In particular, the adversary
can always lengthen the delay (which is easily detectable during the
puzzle validity check), but cannot shrink the delay due to inherently
sequential operations.
Order-preserving bijection. The order-preserving bijection guar-
antees an instance of the totally ordered set elements as derived
from the partially ordered set of the same elements. In particular,
the bijection provides a unique sequence of the totally ordered set
elements. Let us assume there is a partial order relation R = {≤}
on set elements E = (e1, e2, e3, e4) such that R is: reflexive, i.e.,
eiRei ; antisymmetric, i.e., if eiRe j and e jRei then ei = e j ; and
transitive, i.e., if eiRe j and e jRek then eiRek . In addition, the par-
tially ordered set E ′ = ((e1, e2), (e3, e4)) under relation R = {≤}
has a unique minimal and maximal element. Therefore, an order-
preserving bijection generates a linear ordering of elements in set
E ′. Essentially, this linear extension generates a permutation order
of the elements in a given partially ordered set E ′. All of those
permutation sequences in which ei appears before e j given that
(ei ≤ e j ) ∈ E ′ are a valid candidate as per any totally ordered
set element sequence. The reliable ordering of device actuation
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Figure 2: Device ordering on the timeline.
is guaranteed through the linear extension of the owner-defined
schedule even when the application host is unavailable.
3 DECOUPLING CHANNEL ACTIVITY FROM
DEVICE ACTIVITY
This section provides the details of our proposed protocol for decou-
pling channel activities from device activities. First, we illustrate
the device-to-device interaction through an example as below:
3.1 Example
Consider N number of devices (D1,D2, . . . ,DN ) that are connected
through a hub (H ), as shown in Figure 2. Let sion (and sioff ) be the on
(and off) state of a device i . The ownerO can create a partial ordering
for devices such as ⟨(D1,D2,D3), (D4,D5), . . . , (DN−1,DN )⟩ based
on their states, e.g., ⟨(s1on, s2off , s3off ), (s4off , s5on), . . . , (sN−1off , sNon)⟩ that
shows the device D1 must change its state to on, i.e., s1on, before
the devices D2 and D3 change states to off, i.e., s2off and s
3
off . Sim-
ilarly, the device D4 must change its state to off, i.e., s4off , before
the device D5 changes its state to on, i.e., s5on.7 After creating the
partial order of devices, the owner sends a message to the hub that
sends the message (shown in red color) to one of the devices, as
shown D1 in Figure 2. We refer to the message from the hub to
devices as a token. Each device i receives the token at time t ircv ,
forwards the token, and begins computation at time t icom. The bot-
tom part shows when each device receives the token in a sequence
as (D1,D2, . . . ,DN−1,DN ). Note that due to user-defined partial
order of device actuation ⟨(D1,D2,D3), (D4,D5), . . . , (DN−1,DN )⟩,
the devices across the partial orders are mutually incomparable8.
In Figure 2, thick black line (for each device) shows that the device
is having the token and waiting for the predefined time (given in
the token) for its activation, and the green line shows when the
devices start working.
3.2 Verifiable Ordering Protocol
The Section formally defines the verifiable ordering protocol and a
detailed description for each step as below.
Definition 3.1 (Verifiable Ordering Protocol). The verifiable de-
vice ordering protocol is a tuple (param, puzgen, P iD , PO ) of four
polynomial-time algorithms such that:
7For the sake of simplicity this example includes the ordering between the devices and
the corresponding states. However, throughout the paper, our focus is to order time
intervals for devices’ actuation.
8In case, the user finds a change in his/her schedule, then another remote command
can overwrite the previous commands and the schedule workflow, correspondingly.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for order creation.
Inputs: set of l ∈ N devices (Di ), public keys (DiPK )
Variables: P a puzzle, z a command.
1 Function create (cl ,DN )
2 begin
3 for ∀(i, j) ∃(Di ,D j ) ∈ H do
4 schedule ((Di ,Di+1), (D j ,Dj+1))
5 for ∀(i, i + 1) do
6 z = (son ∨ soff ) ∧ (tˆi ≤ tˆi+1)
7 generate (Pi ) = (n,a, tˆi ,Ez ,Ek )
8 mi = enc(Pi ,DiPK )
end for
end for
9 return cl = ((mi ,mi+1), (mj ,mj+1)) end
• Public parameter generator. param(1λ) → (n,a). param(1λ) initial-
izes the prime integer factors n = pq (where p and q are two large
prime numbers) and random value a for the puzzle creation.
• Puzzle generator. puzgen(n,a, tˆ ,Ez ,Ek ) → P. puzgen(n,a, tˆ ,Ez ,Ek )
selects the input values as target time for commands execution
tˆ , encrypted command Ez (z,k), encrypted key Ek (a, tˆ ,n,k) and
outputs a puzzle P for each device.
• Follower Di (Pi , SK) → z(tˆi , t icom] completes the puzzle Pi and
executes the command within the half-open interval, i.e., no earlier
than tˆi but earlier than or at t icom.
• Owner O(P,ϕ(n), PK i ) → accept(t icom ≥ tˆi ) accepts the timely
command execution at each device using ϕ(n).
Setup and key distribution. The manufacturing authority initializes
a unique identity for the owner, hub, and, home devices by using
the secure identity distribution function, say Init(1λ) → identity,
where 1λ is the security parameter that generates a unique identity
for each entity. The certificate authority verifies that each of these
devices knows the private key paired to the public key proposed
for certification as: the homeowner (OSK ,OPK ), the hub (HSK ,HPK ),
and ith home device (DiSK ,D
i
PK ), possesses a valid key pair.
Step 1: Order creation: schedule creation at the owner. The
homeowner O first creates a schedule, say Schedule, for device
actuation. The creation of schedule is inherently specific to the
preferences of the owner on a day to day basis and can include all
or a subset of the home devices. The schedule creation does not
require interaction with any device Di or the hub H . Below we
show a partially ordered timeline/schedule of four devices:
Schedule = ((D1,D2), (D3,D4))
Where only the elements of the same subset are comparable, e.g.,
D1 with D2, and, D3 with D4, based on the timeline. The owner
converts this schedule to a verifiable device ordering (see Algo-
rithm 1), before sending it to hub. The function create(cl ,DN ) of
Algorithm 1 converts a schedule for devices into the partially or-
dered sets of commands of length cl , where l ⊆ N . Line 3 considers
a pair9 of devices in the topology of the hub. Line 4 creates a mu-
tually dependent schedule for the pair of devices with temporal
dependency. Lines 5 and 6 consider all of these mutually dependent
9We consider only pairs of devices, to simply demonstrate the relative ordering. How-
ever, a different subset may contain as large as the total number of devices.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for chaining.
Inputs: set of devices (DN ), user-defined schedule
((Di ,Di+1), (D j ,D j+1))
1 Function chain(Di ,D j ,R) begin
2 for ∀(i, j,R) ∈ schedule(Di ,D j ); iRj = i < j do
3 nPn (Di )
4 for ∀{Di }n! ∧ iRj = true do
5 return nP ′n {Di }ni=1
end for
end
pairs, decide the state of command as z = (son ∨ soff ), and then,
generate a unique puzzle Pi for each device in Line 7. Here, the
puzzle message contains a tuple of variables (n,a, tˆi ,Ez ,Ek ), where
n is the product of two large prime numbers p and q, a is a random
number, tˆi is the time-complexity of the puzzle, Ez is the encrypted
command z using key k , and Ek is the encrypted key k . Line 8 en-
crypts each puzzle Pi into a messagemi for a device Di using the
public key of the device DiPK . Line 9 returns an assembled order cl
that contains an encrypted message for each device corresponding
to the mutually dependent devices in the schedule. This ends the
creation of a relative order for the chosen set of devices. Next, the
homeowner sends securely this order, say Order , to the hub, as
follows:
Order = (Oid ,Hid , cl , Sign(H ,OSK ))
i.e., the homeowner sends its identity (Oid ), the identity of the
hub (Hid ), and encrypted order of commands (cl ) along with hash
digest of all three attributes.
Step 2: Token generation by the hub and token delivery to
devices. On receiving the partial order of commands from the
owner, the hub verifies the sender by computing a local hash digest
H ′ over (Oid ,Hid , cl ). Also the hub verifies the signature usingOPK
and compares the received hash digestH with the locally computed
hash digestH ′. IfH = H ′ then the hub accepts this order.
After the verification of order origination, the hub creates a token
that is used for order delivery (in this step) and for data collection
generated by devices (step 4). The token has three fields: command
field cl , data field, and toggle bit string btoggle . Every token field has
sensitive information regarding the device activity. Therefore, we
assume that the token is encrypted using a shared symmetric key
ks among the devices and the controller hub.
T = E((cl | |Data field | |btoggle),ks )
Owner (O) Hub(H )
(Oid ,OSK ,HPK ) (Hid ,HSK ,OPK )
Encode command mDi = (n, a, tˆi, Ezi, Eki)
Generate order cl = ((m1,m2), ...(ml−1 ,ml))||tval
Send order
(Oid ,Hid ,cl,Sign(H,OSK ))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Authorize Sign(H, OSK )
Create token T = (cl||Data field ||btoggle)
Propagate token T
1
Figure 3: Order creation.
The hub, then, forwards the token among all devices in the topol-
ogy even if a device was not included in the schedule, as shown
in Figure 3. On receiving the token, each device decodes the corre-
sponding command in token and forwards the token to the next
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Device(D i) Device(D i+1 )
(D iid ,D iSK ) (D i+1id ,D i+1SK )
Propagate T
[Diid ,D
i+1
id ,T ]−−−−−−−−−→
Verify |tval − tcur + tdiff | < tadv
Decode message Di+1 SK (mDi+1 )
Propagate T
Begin computation (n, a, tˆi, Ezi, Eki)
1
Figure 4: Token circulation.
peer device in the topology. The next peer device is chosen as per
the topology underneath. Recall that the devices are connected in a
pre-defined topology10 such as in an unidirectional ring, bidirec-
tional ring, star (fault-tolerant), grid, mesh or hybrid setting. Note
that the token rotates constantly in the topology (see Figure 4).
Algorithm 2 explains the linear ordering of devices in function
chain(Di ,D j ,R). The linear ordering condition requires that each
device Di and D j must satisfy: the exact same mutual ordering or
relation R = {≤} as in cl . The line 2 selects each pair (i, j) of device
that is paired under relationR = {≤} in the original schedule. Line 3
enumerates all possible permutations of these devices, say nPn (Di )
where i ∈ N . Line 4 selects one permuted order nP ′n of devices
(from the total number of permutations) such that the precedence
relation still holds true, i.e., iRj = true . Finally, in line 5, the selected
topological order nP ′n is returned from all possible permuted orders
nPn (Di ) of the devices.
Step 3: Order retrieval and puzzle computation at the devices.
Note that the activation sequence of devices is released ahead of
their actual activation; however, we need to restrict them not to
execute the command before prescribed time. Thus, in this step,
devices perform a pre-defined computation task (as detailed in
Figure 5) to unlock and execute the owner-defined command.
It must be noted that unlocking the command is as necessary as
unlocking the command within the prescribed duration, i.e., know-
ing the particular order of a device in the overall sequence. A device
receives the computation task in the form of a puzzle as soon as
the order is delivered in step 2. Subsequently, the device begins the
computation task if the puzzle validity period has not expired yet.
The time-bound during which a device is restricted to begin, as
well as, end the computation task cannot be compressed unless the
device possesses a distinguisher for the factoring problem. There-
fore, the verification that the secure computation task is crucial.
This can be verified through the Euler’s totient as a trapdoor for
factoring n inside the puzzle. Note that the value of n is public and
the value of ϕ(n) is kept secret. Therefore, computing ϕ(n) from n
is as hard as integer factorization. In addition, without the knowl-
edge of ϕ(n) the computation time for Ek is directly dependent on
tˆ time-consuming square operations.
Algorithm 3 explains the verification of time-bounded commands
in function verify(Di , tˆi ). Line 3, considers all devices that are part
of the current schedule. In order to verify that a specific device has
executed the command within the pre-defined interval, O securely
10It must be noted that from the practical deployment aspect it is difficult to connect
these smart devices in a ring topology unless the devices belong to the same OEMs,
e.g., Apple HomeKit. Therefore, a star or a grid topology can be used to combat the
single point of failure and device heterogeneity in the current scenario.
The puzzle messages:
n = pq
tˆ = St ′
Ez = enc(z,k)
Ek = k + a
2tˆ (mod n)
The puzzle computation (P):
(1) Initially, P receives as input a secret key k and encrypt the
original message z denoted as Ez . It must be noticed that each
individual command corresponding to a device Di is secured
in the form of an encrypted message mi . Furthermore, a
cascaded command as a whole contains multiple messages
of these types.
(2) Subsequently, P receives inputs as a secret key k , random
number a, puzzle difficulty level tˆ , modulus n, and then gen-
erate Ek . The puzzle computation relies on the secrecy of key
k used to encrypt a secret message Ez = (z,k). Also, tˆ = S ∗t ′
denotes the difficulty level of the puzzle for a specific device
which can perform S number of square operations per sec-
ond and t ′ is the time to decrypt the message using a regular
encryption scheme.
(3) The puzzle P includes the tuple (n,a, tˆ ,Ez ,Ek ) for which the
computation task is to be solved. Evidently, the recipient of
this puzzle would have to spend at least tˆ amount of time to
complete the computation task and reveal the key k .
Figure 5: Puzzle computation.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for delay verification.
Inputs: a puzzle (P) with a set of public variables
(n,a, tˆi , zi ,ki )
1 Function verify(Di , tˆi )
2 begin
3 for ∀(i, j) ∈ schedule((Di ,Di+1), (D j ,D j+1)) do
4 if a2tˆ mod n ≡ a2tˆ mod ϕ(n)mod n then
5 if (t icom ≤ t i+1com) ∧ (t jcom ≤ t j+1com) then
6 return True
end if
end for
return False end
pre-computes the Euler’s totient ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) such that
p,q is discarded after computing the n and ϕ(n). Line 4, verifies the
time bound for each of these devices, such that
a2
tˆ
mod n ≡ a2tˆ mod ϕ(n)mod n
Line 5 compares the execution order of devices that have hap-
pened as a result of puzzle computation and returns true in line 6 if
it is a total order.
Step 4: Data generation at the devices. Once the devices have
completed the puzzle computation, they generate the data as a
result of the command execution. These home devices are bound
to upload the locally generated data to the hub. In our scheme, the
token contains an anonymous data field to securely transmit the
device generated data to the hub. We use bitwise (b) XOR padding
to overwrite the random data in the token data field as:
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Overwrite data (bo ) = Random data (br ) ⊕ Generated data (bд)
It is cryptographically hard to distinguish the presence of random
data from the device generated data as stored inside the token.
Note that our threat model does not consider the ISP or DNS level
threats, therefore, devices are only assumed to securely generate
and anonymously dispatch the data to the hub and combat any
passive learning attacks within the physical periphery of the home.
Collision: Our token circulation strategy and the token structure
are primarily for smart home scenarios, where we assume that the
single token field can accommodate the peak hour traffic. However,
in case the peak hour traffic exceeds and multiple devices request
for data upload, for example in a multi-tenant building, then to
avoid the collision situation more data fields are required. A simple
approach is to create sub-fields inside the data field such that each
sub-field belongs to a unique device. Thus, each device can fairly
utilize the data upload capacity in any round during the token
circulation.
3.3 Time Analysis
The time spent during the token circulation and puzzle computation
is directly proportional to the number of devices connected in the
network. For example, token begins at time (tHbeg) at the hub and
completes the first round of token circulation at time (tHend ). The
time spent at ith device is (t ifwd − t ircv ) that receive the token at time
(t ircv ) and forward it to next device at time (t ifwd ). Therefore, the
total time spent in one round of token circulation:
tsum = (tHend − tHbeg) − (t ifwd − t ircv)Ni=1
Note that the token circulation time is sequenced and linear w.r.t.
the number of devices. While the puzzle computation time t icom
varies independently among all devices. So the puzzle computation
time at ith device is t icom ≈ tˆ i . In order to optimize the puzzle
computation time and still retain the verifiable guarantees on the
artificial delay, we consider three type of puzzles.
• For comparable devices: Each pair of comparable devices in the
topology requires that tˆ ’s are at least (N − 1)(tNfwd − tN−1fwd ) apart.
The devices forward the token before beginning the local compu-
tation task. Any two adjacent devices (DN−1,DN ) that begin the
computation after forwarding the token, must possess:
|tˆN − tˆN−1 | ≥ (N − 1)(tNfwd − tN−1fwd )
• For incomparable devices: The set of incomparable devices require
that tˆ ’s are exactly (j − i)(t jfwd − t ifwd ) apart. Every time a device
Di forwards a token to Di+1 it jumps (t i+1fwd − t ifwd ) ahead on the
computation timeline with respect to next device due to token
propagation delay. Therefore, in order to provide an identical time
of actuation for all incomparable devices:
|tˆ i − tˆ j | = (j − i)(t jfwd − t ifwd )
The total number of slots required is (N − k) + 1 where k repre-
sents the number of comparable devices. In particular, each compa-
rable device requires a unique and non-overlapping |tˆ | w.r.t. other
comparable devices; while each incomparable device can be sched-
uled for an identical and overlapping |tˆ |.
Token frequency: The token frequency is a crucial attribute from
the perspective of how early a user can decide the schedule for
all N devices and, how many data upload requests are received
during the peak hours. The frequency of token circulation can be
either fixed or random. Let us assume a fixed slot i between any
two consecutive rounds of the token circulation such that the token
begins a new round at every ith unit of time. The optimal length of
the slot is the same as the maximum tˆ i in any schedule.
Slot length =max{tˆ i }l ∈Ni=1
For example, if (tˆ1, tˆ2, . . . , tˆ l−1, tˆ l ) is the time-bound for l devices in
any scheduled workflow then the slot length is same as the farthest
possible device on the timeline of a scheduled workflow.
Table 3 represents the cost comparison based on mathemati-
cal operations such as encryption (E), decryption (D), signature
generation and verification (S), exclusive-OR (XOR), hashing (H ),
scalar multiplication (M), and modular exponentiation (Me). The
scheme in [6] imposes a relative overhead such that (pm ) number
of masking packets are required per traffic flow in case the traffic
flow is lesser than a pre-defined threshold value. Therefore, the
total overhead per traffic flow is (Cpm ) where C is the communi-
cation overhead per packet. Similarly, if the traffic flow is above
the threshold value then those excess packets p′m are delayed and
stored inside a queue. Therefore, the total latency per traffic flow
is (Tp′m ) where T is the latency overhead per packet. As shown
here, that our proposed scheme requires the minimum number of
operations. Further, in our approach the computational complexity
at devices is variable and it depends on the required number of
modular exponentiations, e.g., tˆ , as initialized by the owner.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides the security analysis for proposed scheme.
We first model the security experiment, below, like the standard
security model.
ATTACKGAME 1. LetI be the order-preserving protocol between
the challenger and adversary A then the attack game works as:
• Public parameter generation: The challenger generates (n,a) using
param(1λ).
• Puzzle generation: The challenger generates P using puzgen(n,a,
tˆ ,Ek ,Ez ).
• Query phase: An adversary attempts to attack I through token
query given the access to a recently generated token T ′. The ad-
versary sends a value tˆ to the challenger. The challenger generates
the corresponding puzzle P and adds in cl . The follower devices
receive cl , extract the unique puzzle, and execute the command.
The challenger then sends T ′ to the adversary.
• State identification attempt: The adversary attempts to retrieve the
intermediate state of the computation task and attempts to solve
the puzzle earlier than device through tAcom for the same P in T ′,
such that tAcom is lower than the original tˆ .
An adversaryA wins the game, if tAcom < tˆi and the owner outputs
accept. The probabilistic advantage of the adversary, Adv(A), for
winning the game is:
Adv(A) = Pr [tAcom < tˆi ]
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Protocol Cost at device Cost at hub Cost at owner
Proposed scheme (2D + 1XOR + tˆMe) (1S + 1E + 1XOR) (1S + lE + tˆmodϕ(n)Me)
Scheme [11] (3H + 7XOR + 1E + 1D) (5H + 8XOR + 1E + 1D) -
Scheme [13] (3M + 2H + 4XOR) (1H + 4XOR) -
Scheme [6] - (Cpm +Tp′m ) -
Table 3: Cost comparison between our scheme and existing schemes [6, 11, 13].
We present a sequence of games as Game 0 to Game 2. Each
Game i shows that the advantage of an adversary Pr [tAcom < tˆi ] is
negligibly small. Similarly, each subsequent game Game (i+1) is
produced through previous game such that the changes in secret
parameters remain indistinguishable to the adversary. Therefore,
the advantage of an adversary through changes in secret parameters
(i.e., transitioning from one game to another) remains negligibly
small. If Pr [A(i) → 0] − Pr [A(i + 1) → 0] is non-negligible then
that adversary can be used as a distinguisher or as a solver for
the integer factorization problem in our scheme; where Pr [A(i)]
and Pr [A(i + 1)] represent the probability of adversary winning
the Game i and Game (i+1), respectively. The Game 0 represents
the original attack such that (tAcom = tˆi ) and the artificial delay
before the command execution is kept null. The Game 1 represents
the attack with enhanced t ′ while (tAcom < t ′ ∧ tˆi ). Similarly, the
Game 2 represents the attack with general t ′ while (tAcom = t ′) but
(tAcom < tˆi ).
Game 0: [Record attack] Let us assume that the puzzle P1 con-
tains tˆ = 0 then the device must perform only one iteration to
compute and decode the enciphered command. However, an adver-
sary cannot distinguish an early puzzle such as P1 from a delayed
puzzle such as P2 for which tˆ > 0. In the token query phase, an
adversary gathers the token transcripts for a known value of tˆ .
Experiment Expt
A
com=tˆi
A
let cl ((m1, m2), . . . , (ml−1, ml )) ← A(T)
generate mi (tˆ ) at random
(mk (tˆ )) ← A(cl ((m1, m2), . . . , (ml−1, ml )))
if (mk (tˆ ) =mi (tˆ ))
return 1
else return 0
It is computationally hard to distinguish between encrypted
commands and to identify the command that carries known tˆ within
time tAcom = tˆi . An adversary can distinguish the commands with
the advantage
Adv(A)Game 0 = Pr [mi (tˆ) ← cl ((m1,m2), . . . , (ml−1,ml ))] ≤ ϵ
Game 1: [Clone attack with lesser t ′] Let us assume that the
adversary computes the puzzle in time tAcom < t ′ ∧ tˆi where the
unit time capacity t ′ of the adversary is slower. Therefore, the
advantage of the adversary depends on the probability to compute
the tˆ square operations faster than the home device. This requires
that the adversary can solve the prime factors for modulus n.
Adv(A)Game 1 = Pr [(p,q) ← (n)] ≤ ϵ
Game 2: [Clone attack with general t ′] Let us assume that the
adversary can compute as fast as the home device, i.e., t ′. In partic-
ular, the adversary can also perform S number of square operations
per second. The probability Pr [t ′ = tAcom < tˆi ] that an adversary
A can solve a puzzle with the difficulty level tˆ in lesser time than
Properties [11] [13] [6] Our scheme
Upstream direction ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Downstream direction ✓ × ✓ ✓
Verifiable delay × × × ✓
Partial ordering × × × ✓
Total ordering × × × ✓
Privacy × × ✓ ✓
Passive attack resistant × × ✓ ✓
Active attack resistant ✓ ✓ × ✓
Table 4: Comparison between our and existing schemes.
the home device is negligibly small. Since the adversary must com-
pute S ′ number of operations for each S operations at home device
where (S ′ − S > ϵ):
Adv(A)Game 2 = Pr [tAcom(S ′t ′) ← tˆi (St ′)] ≤ ϵ
In this sequence of games Game 0 through Game 2 the total ad-
vantage of the adversary Adv(A) depends on the sum of the prob-
ability to win each of these games.
Pr [tAcom = tˆi ] + Pr [tAcom < t ′ ∧ tˆi ] + Pr [t ′ = tAcom < tˆi ] ≤ ϵ
Overall, the advantage of the adversary is proportional to the avail-
ability of computational resources to solve the puzzle for all devices
in parallel. Similarly, the advantage of the adversary with respect to
a single puzzle and a single device are proportional to the availabil-
ity of computational resources to solve the inherently sequential
operations of that individual puzzle. Therefore, the total advan-
tage of an adversary to clone the entire timeline depends on the
total computational power for both, the parallel and the sequential
operations to decrypt the command ahead of time.
In Table 4 a comparison is shown between our proposed scheme
and the existing work. The comparison is based on the data flow
direction, ordering, verification of ordering, privacy violation, and
attack resistance.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section evaluates our proposed system using our prototype
implementation. We describe the mock-up testing IoT application,
experimental setup and overall results from our experiments.
5.1 Experiment Setup
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness and performance of our
proposed architecture, we developed the prototype implementa-
tion and setup the testbed in our lab (as shown in Figure 6). This
proof-of-concept prototype implements the protocols described in
Section 3 and a test application with Python. In this mock-up IoT
application, a device awaits and executes two types of command
given by the homeowner. The “Set” command will change a variable
in the program of the target device while the “Read” command will
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Figure 6: Experimental testbed in our lab
require the device to send the variable together with device status,
e.g., RAM and CPU usages, back to the homeowner. This mock-up
application is created to simulate two-way communication between
the homeowner and devices. Further, note that the application runs
on top of the approach, we proposed in this paper.
Figure 6 depicts the architecture and configuration of the smart
home testbed. An Intel NUC system is programmed to work as
the hub H that forwards information between the homeowner and
smart devices. The hub H equips with two network interfaces: (i)
Ethernet interface that has connections to receive the homeowner-
defined schedule and sends the data of smart devices to the home-
owner, and (ii) Wi-Fi interface that is used to communicate with
smart home devices. Smart home device programs are deployed
on three Raspberry Pis (D1,D2,D3) (3rd Gen B+ Model) that are
equipped with built-in Wi-Fi interface. Wi-Fi interfaces on the hub
H and the devices (D1,D2,D3) are configured to work in Wi-Fi
ad-hoc mode [4], which enables direct device-to-device communi-
cation. All Wi-Fi interfaces are configured with pre-defined Wi-Fi
channel, static IP address, and routing information to have a ring
topology. A MacBook Pro with its Wi-Fi interface is deployed in a
different room next to the testbed performs as an adversary, who
listens and dumps all channel activities on the pre-defined channel
into the pcap (packet capture) file for future analysis.
5.2 Results
Based on the testbed described above, we performed different ex-
periments to evaluate the proposed system and the approach. We
first validate our system to check whether it could prevent the ad-
versary from learning device activity from channel activity or not.
Then, we explore the performance of the proposed ring topology
communication with a set of experiments.
Decoupling channel activities from device activities. To eval-
uate the effectiveness that our system protects against the passive
channel listeners, we first defined a sequence of sample user com-
mands, e.g.,D1: Set,D2: Set,D2: Read, andD3: Read. In a one-minute
experiment, these commands will be issued in 10 seconds intervals.
We performed the experiment by executing the above-mentioned
sequence in our proposed system and also over Wi-Fi infrastructure
network without a ring topology to compare with. The channel ac-
tivities are recorded by the passive channel listener laptop deployed
near our testbed.
Figure 7a shows the passive adversary’s view, i.e., which device
receives a message from the homeowner at which time due to chan-
nel activities in the experiment. It is clear that each time the user
sends a command to devices or devices send data to the user, there
will be a peak in the channel activity. Thus, the adversary infers
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Figure 7: The adversarial view due to observing channel ac-
tivities
the device activity and user-device interaction from channel activ-
ity. In contrast, Figure 7b shows the effectiveness of our proposed
approach. Note that the channel activity patterns are completely
eliminated, due to the token ring communication.
Communication latency. Instead of sending individual commands
or data to/from devices or hub, the commands and data in our sys-
tem are encapsulated in tokens and transmitted in a ring topology,
which will incur additional communication latency. We performed
experiments to evaluate the impact of increasing latency as the
number of devices in the ring topology increases. Since we only
have a very limited number of real devices, we modified our proto-
col to simulate the scenario that includes a large number of devices
to investigate an impact on communication latency. To achieve
this goal, we add a counter in each token. When the hub generates
the token, it sets the counter equals to the number of devices we
want to simulate in the experiments. This counter is decreased by
one when each device receives and forwards the token to the next
device. When the last device (D3 in our testbed) in the ring topology
receives the token, it checks the value of the current counter. If the
value of the counter is more than zero,D3 forwards the token to the
first device (D1) to extend the ring topology. If the counter number
is less than or equal to zero, the last device forwards the token back
to the hub to complete a single round of the token. Here, since each
device will receive the same token multiple times, we also need to
prevent the device from solving same puzzles and executing same
commands multiple times. To do so, a unique token ID is added
to each token. Thus, the device solves the puzzle and executes the
command only when the device gets a new token ID.
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Figure 8 shows that both mean and variation of the latency
increase as more devices added into the ring topology. The mean
of latency rises linearly at the beginning as each additional hop in
the ring topology introduces more latency. After around 39 devices
in the ring topology, the mean latency starts rising faster, since
the length of token also increases with the growth of a number of
devices. Consequently, it may take more time at devices to transmit
the token to the next hop. Of course, the ring latency is not affected,
when there is a few devices, since the number of commands and
toggle bit strings decrease in the token as an decreasing number
of devices. The variation of latency gets larger since it is more
likely that the token transmission at more hops get delayed or re-
transmitted because of unexpected interference or system lag at
the devices.
# Devices 3 27 51 63 75
Avg. Token Len(bytes) 1807 5024 8189 9757 11305
Table 5: Average token length for ring topology size
Communication and computation overheads. It is also impor-
tant to understand the additional overheads incurred due to our
approach. We first measure how the length of token increases as
the number of devices grows. Table 5 shows that the average token
length grows linearly. We also use a USB power meter to measure
the power consumption of the Raspberry Pi in different working
states. Table 6 shows that our system introduces 63% more power
consumption to completely eliminate the channel activity patterns
of all devices.
6 RELATEDWORK
There exist various IoT frameworks such as Apple HomeKit, Smart-
Thing, Azure IoT Suite, IBM Watson IoT platform, Brillo/Weave plat-
form by Google, Calvin IoT platform by Ericsson, ARM mbed IoT
platform, Kura IoT project by Eclipse, interested readers may re-
fer [3, 7] for more details. Overall, the smart home communica-
tion [8, 10] is a network component that executes commands based
on contextual factors. To the best of our knowledge, none of the
work [5, 6] highlight the significance of secure device ordering in a
smart home scenario. We highlight the presence of a pattern among
smart home devices such that a partial ordering on device activity is
observed on daily basis. The authors in [6] have presented a privacy-
preserving traffic shaping scheme to mask the channel activity and
thereby the device or user activity at the ISP level. According to
the scheme, if the shaped traffic rate is lower than the device traf-
fic then the packets are queued, and if the shaped traffic rate is
higher than the device traffic then the dummy packets are added to
State Idle IoT App w/o Ring Sys. IoT App w/ Ring Sys.
Avg. Power 2.25W 3.03W 4.91W
Table 6: Average energy consumption of devices in different
working states
cover the original traffic rate variations. However, these techniques
do not avoid the inferences on device activity pattern due to the
straightforward binding between the channel activity and device
activity. Our scheme decouples the channel activity from the device
activity such that a communication activity over the channel at
any given time cannot be coupled with a specific device activity
or the user activity. The recent work [11, 13] provides a security
framework for home devices and guarantees message anonymity
and unlinkability during the communication sessions from hub to
the device. The scheme is based on authentication and one-time
session key agreement in a 3-way handshake protocol. However, as
mentioned, authentication and encrypted message cannot prevent
the inferences over the communication activity.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the security and privacy challenges in smart
homes that facilitate the execution of multiple workflows. In par-
ticular, our solution avoids any inference attacks regarding these
workflows that can reveal the user activity pattern, both in the past
and the future. The primary source of these inference attacks is the
ability to learn communication patterns among the smart home de-
vices. The channel activity and the corresponding device activities
are also sensitive from the user’s privacy perspective. Therefore,
decoupling the channel activity from the device activity is essential
to hide the execution of scheduled workflows.
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